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Seventh Special Report
The Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee published its Eighth Report of Session 
2017–19, Disinformation and ‘ fake news’: Final Report (HC 1791) on 18 February 2019. 
The Government’s response was received on 3 May 2019 and is appended to this report.
Appendix: Government Response
Introduction
The Government is grateful for the Committee’s comprehensive inquiry into ‘fake news’ 
and disinformation. We agree with the Committee that disinformation threatens the 
intrinsic values and principles of the UK, and it is right that Government addresses this 
issue as a matter of priority. This detailed and considered inquiry has made a valuable 
contribution to the public debate on disinformation and a range of other related issues. 
The evidence, conclusions and recommendations in the Committee’s interim and final 
reports have enabled the Government to draw on a wide stakeholder and evidence base 
in considering how best to tackle these issues, including in preparing the Online Harms 
White Paper. Following the conclusion of the Committee’s inquiry, the Government 
welcomes Parliament’s continued engagement on this important issue. We hope the new 
Sub-Committee on disinformation expertise will continue to be valuable as we refine and 
implement our measures to tackle disinformation in all its forms.
This response builds on the Government’s response to the Committee’s Interim Report, 
which was published on 23 October 2018. This response should also be read in conjunction 
with the Online Harms White Paper, published on 8 April 2019. Many of the Committee’s 
recommendations are in line with and addressed in the White Paper. The Secretary of 
State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport wrote a letter sent to the Committee to outline 
how the White Paper tackled the Committee’s recommendations on 8 April 2019.
The Government agrees with the Committee that the current self regulatory approach 
online is insufficient and that there is an urgent need to establish independent regulation. 
That is why the White Paper commits to introducing a new regulatory approach as 
well as proposals for new legislative measures to ensure that companies remove illegal 
content; adopt new safety technologies; better manage and monitor harmful content; and 
support safety education and awareness for all users. We have also initiated a major public 
consultation on the detail of how future regulation of online harms will be delivered in 
the UK.
The White Paper also clearly sets out the Government’s concerns about disinformation 
and proposals to tackle this issue. Disinformation is one of the harms in scope of the new 
regulatory framework, and the White Paper makes clear our expectations for companies 
to take action to limit the spread of disinformation on their platforms. The Government 
also agrees with the Committee that education and awareness are key to long-term success 
in building society’s resilience to disinformation as well as other online harms. We are 
confident that the White Paper’s educational measures and initiatives will help to equip 
all citizens with the skills they need to assess critically the content they consume online.
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Furthermore, the White Paper outlines the Government’s concerns about wider online 
manipulation. We are confident that the measures outlined in the White Paper will tackle 
disinformation effectively in a way that protects freedom of expression and promotes 
innovation. However, we recognise that disinformation and other tactics to manipulate 
are complex and will continue to evolve with technology. The Government’s work to 
tackle disinformation and online manipulation does not stop with the publication of the 
White Paper. We will continue to engage with stakeholders in industry, civil society and 
Parliament to build our understanding of emerging issues and how we, as a society, should 
respond to them.
A number of the Committee’s recommendations relate to protecting our elections and 
other democratic processes. Government agrees that protecting these processes, be that 
from electoral fraud or foreign interference, is a key priority. The Online Harms White 
Paper outlines proposals for improving the safety of the whole information environment, 
which will support this objective. We also urge the Committee to consider the recent 
Government response to the ‘Protecting the Debate: Intimidation, Influence and 
Information’ consultation.
The need to tackle disinformation has emerged as a theme in a number of other independent 
and Government reviews. We encourage the Committee to review the ‘Unlocking digital 
competition, Report of the Digital Competition Expert Panel’ published 13 March 2019, 
which carefully considers competition in digital markets. As this response sets out, we 
will also be formally responding to the recommendations in Dame Cairncross’ recent 
report on the sustainability of the press.
Recommendation 12 is addressed to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) 
and Recommendation 40 concerns the work of the National Crime Agency (NCA). 
Recommendations 15 and 47 are addressed wholly or in part to the Competition and 
Markets Authority (CMA), Ofcom, the ICO, the Electoral Commission, and the 
Advertising Standards Agency (ASA). As set out in our response to the Committee’s 
Interim Report, it is not appropriate for the Government to comment on or respond on 
behalf of independent bodies or investigations. As such, this response focuses only on 
those recommendations addressed to Government.
Recommendation 1
We repeat the recommendation from our Interim Report that a new category of 
tech company is formulated, which tightens tech companies’ liabilities, and which is 
not necessarily either a ‘platform’ or a ‘publisher’. This approach would see the tech 
companies assume legal liability for content identified as harmful after it has been 
posted by users. We ask the Government to consider this new category of tech company 
in its forthcoming White Paper. (Paragraph 14)
Government response:
The approach set out in the White Paper does not include creating a new category of tech 
company. We carefully considered how changes based on the existing content liability 
framework could place greater responsibility on companies and concluded that this is not 
the most effective mechanism for driving change. Instead, the White Paper sets out how 
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a wide range of companies will be expected to deal with both illegal and harmful, but 
legal, content on their platforms, through a statutory Duty of Care and Codes of Practice, 
enforced by an independent regulator.
The White Paper explains that following a review, the Government concluded that a 
regulatory model which focused solely on liability for the presence of illegal content would 
not incentivise the sort of systemic improvements in governance and risk management 
processes that are necessary. The Duty of Care model will incentivise such systemic 
improvements, and will also increase online service providers’ responsibilities.
The White Paper proposes that this regulatory framework will apply to all companies 
that allow users to share or discover content or interact with each other online. This will 
ensure legislation remains fit for purpose and future proofed, as the nature and form of 
tech companies change over time. The White Paper includes a consultation question on 
whether this scope provides a suitable basis for an effective and proportionate approach.
In addition, the White Paper sets out the range of harms that will fall within the scope of 
new regulation This list is, by design, not exhaustive nor fixed to ensure swift regulatory 
action is possible to address new forms of online harm, new technologies, content and new 
online activities.
This approach will see companies required to ensure that they have effective and 
proportionate processes and governance in place to reduce the risk of illegal and harmful 
activity on their platforms, as well as to take appropriate and proportionate action when 
issues arise. The new regulatory regime will also ensure effective oversight of the take-
down of illegal content and will introduce specific monitoring requirements for tightly 
defined categories of illegal content.
Recommendation 3
Our Interim Report recommended that clear legal liabilities should be established for 
tech companies to act against harmful or illegal content on their sites. There is now an 
urgent need to establish independent regulation. We believe that a compulsory Code 
of Ethics should be established, overseen by an independent regulator, setting out what 
constitutes harmful content. The independent regulator would have statutory powers 
to monitor relevant tech companies; this would create a regulatory system for online 
content that is as effective as that for offline content industries. (Paragraph 37)
Government response:
The Government strongly agrees with the need to establish independent regulation. The 
White Paper sets out a regulatory framework, based around a new statutory Duty of Care 
for companies to keep their users safe, with an independent regulator to enforce this.
The independent regulator will implement, oversee and enforce the new regulatory 
framework. We also expect the regulator to work with industry to encourage the 
development of technologies that aid compliance, and to facilitate cross-sector collaboration 
and sharing of expertise.
The White Paper also sets out how the regulator will produce Codes of Practice covering 
the key online harms that are set out in the White Paper. The Codes will set out what 
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companies in scope will need to do to meet their new legal responsibilities. We agree with 
the Committee that enforcement powers will be critical and the White Paper provides 
examples of the enforcement powers the regulator could have. It will be for the regulator 
to assess whether companies have fulfilled their Duty of Care to users by following the 
relevant Codes of Practice. If companies want to fulfil these duties in a manner not set out 
in the Codes, they will have to explain and justify to the regulator how their alternative 
approach will effectively tackle harmful content on their services.
Recommendation 4
As we said in our Interim Report, such a Code of Ethics should be similar to the 
Broadcasting Code issued by Ofcom - which is based on the guidelines established in 
section 319 of the 2003 Communications Act. The Code of Ethics should be developed 
by technical experts and overseen by the independent regulator, in order to set down in 
writing what is and is not acceptable on social media. This should include harmful and 
illegal content that has been referred to the companies for removal by their users, or 
that should have been easy for tech companies themselves to identify. (Paragraph 38)
Government response:
The White Paper sets out that the regulator will issue Codes of Practice setting out the steps 
companies should take to fulfil their Duty of Care. The White Paper sets out high-level 
expectations which the Government expects the regulator to include within the Codes. 
These include areas such as ensuring reporting processes and processes for moderating 
content and activity are transparent and effective, and ensuring that harmful content is 
dealt with promptly. The regulator will ultimately decide on the content of the Codes but 
will develop them with stakeholders in an open and transparent way.
Recommendation 5
The process should establish clear, legal liability for tech companies to act against 
agreed harmful and illegal content on their platform and such companies should have 
relevant systems in place to highlight and remove ‘types of harm’ and to ensure that 
cyber security structures are in place. If tech companies (including technical engineers 
involved in creating the software for the companies) are found to have failed to meet 
their obligations under such a Code, and not acted against the distribution of harmful 
and illegal content, the independent regulator should have the ability to launch legal 
proceedings against them, with the prospect of large fines being administered as the 
penalty for non-compliance with the Code. (Paragraph 39)
Government response:
Government agrees that sufficient enforcement powers will be critical to the success of 
the regulator. The White Paper sets out the Government’s plans to introduce a statutory 
Duty of Care for an independent regulator to enforce. The Government is committed 
to ensuring that the regulator has sufficient powers to perform its duties effectively. The 
White Paper sets out in broad terms the core enforcement measures that the regulator will 
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have. The regulator will have powers to take action where breaches of the Duty of Care 
manifest, including the ability to levy substantial fines. We are confident that will ensure 
that all companies in scope of the regulatory framework fulfil their Duty of Care.
We are also consulting on additional powers that, in extreme cases, will hold senior 
management liable for major breaches of the Duty of Care and enable the regulator to 
require ISPs to block access to non-compliant websites or apps from within the UK.
The Government also expects the regulator to build on existing work that promotes 
design and adoption of systems for detecting and responding to illegal or harmful content, 
including the use of AI-based technology and trained moderators.
Recommendation 6
This same public body should have statutory powers to obtain any information from 
social media companies that are relevant to its inquiries. This could include the 
capability to check what data is being held on an individual user, if a user requests such 
information. This body should also have access to tech companies’ security mechanisms 
and algorithms, to ensure they are operating responsibly. This public body should be 
accessible to the public and be able to take up complaints from members of the public 
about social media companies. We ask the Government to put forward these proposals 
in its forthcoming White Paper. (Paragraph 40)
Government response:
We agree with the Committee that social media companies have simply not provided 
sufficient access to their data to allow for the collection of robust information. It is right 
that the Government should intervene to establish clear standards. A key objective of 
the new regulatory framework will be to develop a culture of transparency, trust and 
accountability. Consistent standards of transparency will be a critical element of the new 
regulatory framework. Instrumental to this will be the regulator’s information gathering 
powers, both to assess companies’ compliance with the Duty of Care and to enable the 
regulator to require additional information, including about the operation of algorithms.
The White Paper proposes that the regulator is able to require companies to submit 
annual transparency reports and provide additional information to inform their oversight 
or enforcement activity and assess companies’ compliance. The regulator will have the 
power to require additional information from companies to enable it to undertake 
thematic reviews of areas of concern, for example a review into the treatment of self-harm 
or suicide content. It should be emphasised that these processes will be consistent with 
data protection regulations.
The Government recognises the growing public concern about the risk that online harms 
pose to our citizens, especially children and the most vulnerable. We want to renew their 
confidence in the online world. The regulator will have responsibilities to engage with the 
public to promote education and awareness raising about online safety.
We do not envisage that the regulator will deal with individual complaints under the 
White Paper proposals. Under the regulatory framework, the user will get up to three 
tiers of consideration for their complaint under a company’s T&Cs. There will be two 
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considerations by the company in question (i.e. a right to complain and the right to appeal 
a decision to the company), and once by either an industry-led scheme or body (Option 1) 
or by the regulator, via the super complaints route (Option 2). The third tier is being 
consulted on. We encourage the Committee to work with us throughout the consultation 
period.
Recommendation 7
We support the Recommendation from the ICO that inferred data should be as 
protected under the law as personal information. Protections of privacy law should 
be extended beyond personal information to include models used to make inferences 
about an individual. We recommend that the Government studies the way in which 
the protection of privacy law can be expanded to include models that are used to make 
inferences about individuals, in particular during political campaigning. This will 
ensure that inferences about individuals are treated as importantly as individuals’ 
personal information. (Paragraph 48)
Government response:
The Data Protection Act 2018 and the GDPR introduced in May last year includes a robust 
framework protecting the information rights of individuals. The GDPR gives data subjects 
the tools to understand the way in which their data has been processed. Processing must 
be transparent, details of that processing must be provided to every data subject, whether 
or not the data was collected directly from them, and data subjects are entitled to a copy 
of the data held about them. Data controllers should not be able to hide behind complex 
algorithms.
The Government will continue to work closely with the Information Commissioner to 
make sure she has the powers she needs to equip her for complex investigations. Issues 
relating to inferred data will depend on the individual circumstances of the case and 
be considered in light of the relevant legislation. We will continue to work with the 
Commissioner to keep the data protection framework under review.
Recommendation 8
In our Interim Report, we recommended a levy should be placed on tech companies 
operating in the UK to support the enhanced work of the ICO. We reiterate this 
Recommendation. The Chancellor’s decision, in his 2018 Budget, to impose a new 2% 
digital services tax on UK revenues of big technology companies from April 2020, shows 
that the Government is open to the idea of a levy on tech companies. The Government’s 
response to our Interim Report implied that it would not be financially supporting 
the ICO any further, contrary to our Recommendation. We urge the Government to 
reassess this position. (Paragraph 51)
Government response:
The Government is committed to ensuring that the ICO is a world-class regulator, working 
effectively across the UK to safeguard the rights of individuals in relation to their data. As 
the ICO’s sponsoring Department, DCMS has a specific responsibility to ensure adequate 
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ongoing funding for the ICO. We engage in regular dialogue with the Information 
Commissioner and her office about their current and future funding, including potential 
alternative sources of funding. We introduced new data protection charges in May of last 
year that have provided an estimated increase of £18 million to the ICO’s income for 
2018/19. These increased funds have enabled the ICO to develop its expertise and recruit 
an additional 200 staff to support their ongoing data protection work.
Recommendation 9
The new independent system and regulation that we recommend should be established 
must be adequately funded. We recommend that a levy is placed on tech companies 
operating in the UK to fund its work. (Paragraph 52)
Government response:
The Government strongly agrees that the independent regulator must have adequate 
funding. We are committed to ensuring the regulator has sufficient resources and the 
right expertise and capability to perform its role effectively. The White Paper includes 
a consultation question on whether the regulator should be a new or existing body. 
The regulator will be funded by industry in the medium term, and the Government is 
considering suitable funding models, including a levy, to put the regulator on a sustainable 
footing.
A wide variety of organisations of all sizes, including start-ups and SMEs, will be in scope 
of the regulatory framework. This comprehensive approach is important for the efficacy 
of the new regulatory framework. To ensure a proportionate approach, the application 
of the regulatory requirements and the Duty of Care model will reflect the diversity of 
organisations in scope. We will recognise this in developing options for the funding 
model. We encourage the Committee to engage with the Government on this further 
during the consultation period.
Recommendation 14
In our Interim Report, we stated that the dominance of a handful of powerful tech 
companies has resulted in their behaving as if they were monopolies in their specific 
area, and that there are considerations around the data on which those services are 
based. Facebook, in particular, is unwilling to be accountable to regulators around 
the world. The Government should consider the impact of such monopolies on the 
political world and on democracy. (Paragraph 138)
Government response:
As noted within the DCMS Select Committee Interim Report, the Government recognises 
that digital services – particularly those that are free-to-use and funded by advertising – 
pose challenges to our existing competition frameworks.
In September 2018 the Chancellor commissioned an independent Digital Competition 
Expert Panel, chaired by Professor Jason Furman, to look at competition in the 
digital economy. The Panel’s report was published on 13 March. Its pro-innovation 
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recommendations fit with the Government’s wider strategy for an open and competitive 
economy, demonstrating that, as the UK leaves the EU, Government is doing the important 
long-term economic planning to benefit businesses and consumers. The Government will 
respond to Furman’s specific recommendations later this year.
The Data Protection Act (DPA) 2018 and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
updated our data protection framework to make it fit for the digital age, in which an 
ever-increasing amount of data is being processed. The GDPR sits alongside the DPA; 
strengthening provisions to keep people’s data safe and secure while making sure 
organisations who use it are doing so properly and for legitimate reasons. The ICO has 
powers to investigate organisations that do not comply with the new data protection 
regime and can issue fines if organisations fail to meet particular legal requirements.
Recommendation 15
The Competitions and Market Authority (CMA) should conduct a comprehensive 
audit of the operation of the advertising market on social media. The Committee made 
this Recommendation its Interim Report, and we are pleased that it has also been 
supported in the independent Cairncross Report commissioned by the Government 
and published in February 2019. Given the contents of the Six4Three documents that 
we have published, it should also investigate whether Facebook specifically has been 
involved in any anti-competitive practices and conduct a review of Facebook’s business 
practices towards other developers, to decide whether Facebook is unfairly using its 
dominant market position in social media to decide which businesses should succeed 
or fail. We hope that the Government will include these considerations when it reviews 
the UK’s competition powers in April 2019, as stated in the Government response to 
our Interim Report. Companies like Facebook should not be allowed to behave like 
‘digital gangsters’ in the online world, considering themselves to be ahead of and 
beyond the law. (Paragraph 139)
Government response:
The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) is responsible for the enforcement of 
competition policy and therefore decisions over investigations are a matter for them. 
However, we agree that such an audit is necessary, given similar recommendations from 
both the Cairncross and Furman reviews. The Secretary of State has written to the CMA 
encouraging them to undertake such a review.
As noted in our response to Recommendation 14, we recognise the challenges digital 
services can pose to competition frameworks, and the Government will respond to the 
Furman Review’s recommendations later in the year.
Recommendation 20
We repeat the Recommendation from our Interim Report, that the Government 
should look at the ways in which the UK law should define digital campaigning, 
including having agreed definitions of what constitutes online political advertising, 
such as agreed types of words that continually arise in adverts that are not sponsored 
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by a specific political party. There also needs to be an acknowledgement of the role 
and power of unpaid campaigns and Facebook Groups that influence elections and 
referendums (both inside and outside the designated period). (Paragraph 210)
Government response:
The Government acknowledges the potential threat to democracy posed by disinformation. 
We have set out in the White Paper how personal data and online advertising structures 
can be misused to target people with deliberately false or misleading information; and the 
importance of, and expectations for, transparency. Government expects the new regulator’s 
Code of Practice for disinformation to include guidance for organisations on improving 
the transparency of political advertising, helping to meet any requirements in electoral 
law. The Government also announced on 12 February that we would conduct a review 
into online advertising in the UK. This will assess the wider impact online advertising has 
on the economy and society.
In addition, the Cabinet Office has considered the responses to the public consultation 
‘Protecting the Debate: Intimidation, Influence and Information’ which closed on 28 
October 2018. The consultation included proposed changes to electoral law, including 
the inclusion of digital imprints on digital electoral material, the definition of electoral 
material and what forms of digital communications could be covered by electoral law. 
The Government has published its response to the consultation setting out how the 
Government intends to proceed on this issue.
Recommendation 21
Electoral law is not fit for purpose and needs to be changed to reflect changes in 
campaigning techniques, and the move from physical leaflets and billboards to online, 
micro-targeted political campaigning. There needs to be: absolute transparency of 
online political campaigning, including clear, persistent banners on all paid-for 
political adverts and videos, indicating the source and the advertiser; a category 
introduced for digital spending on campaigns; and explicit rules surrounding 
designated campaigners’ role and responsibilities. (Paragraph 211)
Government response:
The Government agrees that the digital age has encouraged changes in campaigning 
techniques, and that greater transparency would be beneficial. The Online Harms White 
Paper includes a number of steps we expect the new regulator to include in a Code of 
Practice for disinformation, proposing that responsibilities could be placed on companies 
in scope to implement measures to increase transparency of political advertising and 
ensure that their users can clearly distinguish advertisements from organic content. 
Furthermore, we will use the findings from the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation 
(CDEI)’s first two projects looking at microtargeting and algorithmic bias to inform our 
approach to ensuring these practices are used legitimately online.
Candidates, political parties and non-party campaigners are currently required to have 
an imprint on any printed election material, to demonstrate that they have produced it. 
Extending this to include digital communications is essential for promoting fact-based 
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political debate and tackling disinformation online. The Government sought views on 
this in a public consultation on ‘Protecting the Debate’, which was launched last year 
by the Prime Minister. The Government’s recently published response reveals that the 
majority of people who engaged were in favour of this extension.
The Cabinet Office will work closely with the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and 
Sport and other stakeholders to confirm how such regulations will be put into practice and 
which third party organisations it would extend to. The Government will bring forward 
the technical proposal for this regime later on this year.
In addition, the Government is currently working with the Electoral Commission on 
statutory Codes of Practice for registered parties and candidates on electoral expenses. 
This provides clarity on digital campaigning election expenses. The Codes should come 
into force for the next major elections scheduled to take place in 2021 and 2022. The 
Government will also continue to work with the Electoral Commission on guidance for 
upcoming elections to ensure there is clarity on the processes and procedures for parties, 
candidates and campaigners.
Recommendation 22
We would expect that the Cabinet Office’s consultation will result in the Government 
concluding that paid-for political advertising should be publicly accessible, clear and 
easily recognisable. Recipients should be able to identify the source, who uploaded it, 
who sponsored it, and its country of origin. (Paragraph 212)
Government response:
The Government has announced that candidates, political parties and non-party 
campaigners will be required to brand or ‘imprint’ their digital election materials, so the 
public is clear who is targeting them. This is a crucial step for helping prevent misleading 
political advertising online. The Cabinet Office will work closely with the Department for 
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport and other stakeholders to confirm how such regulations 
will be put into practice and which third party organisations it would extend to. The 
Government will bring forward the technical proposal for this regime later on this year. 
Furthermore, we recognise that political campaigning happens year-round, and we will 
consider how these proposals can be applied outside of electoral periods.
The Online Harms White Paper acknowledges how personal data and online advertising 
structures can be misused to target people with deliberately false or misleading information, 
and the importance of transparency. The White Paper proposes that the Code of Practice 
for disinformation, which will ultimately be determined by the independent regulator, 
could include responsibilities for companies in scope to implement measures to increase 
transparency of political advertising.
Recommendation 23
The Government should carry out a comprehensive review of the current rules and 
regulations surrounding political work during elections and referenda including: 
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increasing the length of the regulated period; defining what constitutes political 
campaigning; and reducing the time for spending returns to be sent to the Electoral 
Commission. (Paragraph 213)
Government response:
The Government will continue to work with the Electoral Commission and political 
parties to identify and implement any reforms and clarifications to the law, regulations 
and practices around campaigning. We are committed to ensuring that the law and 
regulations around campaigning are up-to-date with technological advances in campaign 
techniques.
This includes the Government’s work with the Electoral Commission on statutory Codes 
of Practice for registered parties and candidates on electoral expenses. New Codes 
will provide clarity on digital campaigning election expenses. The Codes should come 
into force for the next major elections scheduled to take place in 2021 and 2022. The 
Government is carefully considering recent recommendations made by the Electoral 
Commission’s report ‘Digital campaigning: increasing transparency for voters’, published 
in June 2018. Recommendations include amending the rules for reporting spending. The 
Government will also continue to work with the Electoral Commission on guidance for 
upcoming elections to ensure there is clarity on the processes and procedures for parties, 
candidates and campaigners.
Recommendation 24
The Government should explore ways in which the Electoral Commission can be given 
more powers to carry out its work comprehensively, including the following measures:
• the legal right to compel organisations that they do not currently regulate, 
including social media companies, to provide information relevant to their 
inquiries;
• The Electoral Commission’s current maximum fine limit of £20,000 should 
be increased, and changed to a fine based on a fixed percentage of turnover, in 
line with powers already conferred on other statutory regulators;
• The ability for the Electoral Commission to petition against an election due 
to illegal actions, which currently can only be brought by an individual;
• The ability for the Electoral Commission to intervene or stop someone acting 
illegally in a campaign if they live outside the UK. (Paragraph 214)
Government response:
The Government is considering the Electoral Commission’s recommendations in its June 
2018 report, ‘Digital campaigning: Increasing transparency for voters’, plus other reports 
that propose increasing the Electoral Commission’s powers. The Government recognise 
the importance of these issues and are not complacent, however it is critical we ensure 
that any regulation is proportionate. Political parties and other groups who seek to engage 
democratically are often voluntary organisations, not large corporations. There is a risk 
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that disproportionate regulation could discourage volunteering and undermine local 
democracy. These are all issues that the Government is considering and we will respond 
in due course. The Electoral Commission has civil sanctioning powers that apply to 
referendums and elections. More serious criminal matters can and are referred to the 
police, and then considered by a court of law. The courts already have the power to levy 
unlimited fines.
Recommendation 25
Political advertising items should be publicly accessible in a searchable repository—
who is paying for the ads, which organisations are sponsoring the ad, who is being 
targeted by the ads—so that members of the public can understand the behaviour of 
individual advertisers. It should be run independently of the advertising industry and 
of political parties. This Recommendation builds on paragraph 144 of our Interim 
Report. (Paragraph 215)
Government response:
It is important that users have information on the advertising they see online and have 
the option to learn more. Several social media companies have introduced tools and 
policies to increase transparency of political advertising on their platforms, including 
repositories or ‘ad libraries’. The Government welcomes these voluntary steps. However, 
we recognise that these measures are far from perfect, and agree with the Committee 
that more needs to be done to increase transparency. As highlighted previously in the 
responses to Recommendations 20, 21 and 22, the White Paper proposes that the Code 
of Practice for disinformation include expectations for companies to improve the overall 
transparency of political advertising on their platforms. This includes ensuring that their 
users can clearly distinguish advertisements from organic content and publishing data 
that supports research into the nature of online disinformation activity.
In addition, the online advertising review, announced on 12 February will consider 
additional measures the Government could take to promote better understanding of the 
advertising ecosystem.
Recommendation 26
We agree with the ICO’s proposal that a Code of Practice, which highlights the use of 
personal information in political campaigning and applying to all data controllers who 
process personal data for the purpose of political campaigning, should be underpinned 
by primary legislation. We urge the Government to act on the ICO’s Recommendation 
and bring forward primary legislation to place these Codes of Practice into statute. 
(Paragraph 216)
Government response:
The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) intend to issue clearer guidance for political 
parties, regardless of whether it is later put on a statutory footing. As an independent 
regulator, they have powers in the Data Protection Act 2018 to introduce non-statutory 
codes of practice. In addition, the Government is considering the feasibility of having a 
13Government Response to the Committee’s Eighth Report
Statutory Code of Practice for political parties, whilst respecting the intent of Parliament 
to provide a lawful basis in the Act for data processing activities that are necessary to 
support or promote democratic engagement.
Recommendation 27
We support the ICO’s Recommendation that all political parties should work with the 
ICO, the Cabinet Office and the Electoral Commission, to identify and implement a 
cross-party solution to improve transparency over the use of commonly-held data. 
This would be a practical solution to ensure that the use of data during elections and 
referenda is treated lawfully. We hope that the Government will work towards making 
this collaboration happen. We hope that the Government will address all of these issues 
when it responds to its consultation, “Protecting the Debate: Intimidation, Influence, 
and Information” and to the Electoral Commission’s report, “Digital Campaigning: 
increasing transparency for voters”. A crucial aspect of political advertising and 
influence is that of foreign interference in elections, which we hope it will also strongly 
address. (Paragraph 217)
Government response:
Political parties are still required to respect the overarching data protection principles, 
including requirements to process people’s data fairly, lawfully and transparently. The 
Data Protection Act 2018 does not exempt them from these principles. We will continue 
to work with the ICO and other regulators such as the Electoral Commission to make sure 
that roles and responsibilities are clear.
The Government are reviewing existing legislation on access to electoral registers to ensure 
elected representatives and political parties can continue to use the electoral register for 
the purposes of democratic engagement. This reflects the commitment by Ministers 
during the Data Protection Bill. We have also engaged with political parties through the 
Parliamentary Parties Panel.
Recommendation 29
Tech companies must address the issue of shell companies and other professional 
attempts to hide identity in advert purchasing, especially around political advertising—
both within and outside campaigning periods. There should be full disclosure of the 
targeting used as part of advertising transparency. The Government should explore 
ways of regulating the use of external targeting on social media platforms, such as 
Facebook’s Custom Audiences. (Paragraph 223)
Government response:
The DCMS Secretary of State has asked the Chair of the Centre for Data Ethics and 
Innovation (CDEI) to investigate the advances in targeting and profiling practices and 
consider what steps can be taken to ensure they are understood and trusted by the public, 
while best supporting business. This review will play an important role in ensuring 
transparency and fairness in the practice of external targeting. The CDEI will publish 
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an interim progress update on this project this summer, followed by a final report in 
December 2019. The CDEI’s recommendations will also feed into the Government’s review 
of online advertising regulation.
As also stated above, the Government is encouraging action to increase transparency of 
political advertising. This is reflected in the steps we expect the new regulator to include 
in Code of Practice for disinformation outlined in the White Paper, which proposes that 
duties be placed on companies in scope to take steps to increase transparency of political 
advertising on their platforms and help their users distinguish between paid-for and 
organic content.
Recommendation 32
We support the Electoral Commission in its request that the Government extend the 
transparency rules around donations made to political parties in Northern Ireland 
from 2014. This period of time would cover two UK general elections, two Northern 
Ireland Assembly elections, the Scottish independence referendum, the EU referendum, 
and EU and local government elections. We urge the Government to make this change 
in the law as soon as is practicable to ensure full transparency over these elections and 
referendums. (Paragraph 234)
Government response:
The Transparency of Donations and Loans etc. (Northern Ireland Political Parties) Order 
2018 introduced transparency from July 2017. This was the result of a consultation process 
with the Northern Ireland political parties, which provided a broad consensus in favour 
of transparency for future donations and loans. The Government intends to undertake an 
operational review of the broader framework for donations and loans in Northern Ireland 
in due course. This will consider if there is a case for further reform.
Recommendation 33
We welcome Dame Frances Cairncross’s report on safeguarding the future of 
journalism, and the establishment of a code of conduct to rebalance the relationship 
between news providers and social media platforms. In particular, we welcome the 
Recommendation that online digital newspapers and magazines should be zero rated 
for VAT, as is the case for printed versions. This would remove the false incentive 
for news companies against developing more paid-for digital services. We support 
the Recommendation that chimes with our own on investigating online advertising, 
in particular focussing on the major search and social media companies, by the 
Competition and Markets Authority. (Paragraph 236)
Government response:
High quality news and journalism is vital to healthy social and democratic engagement. 
The Government commissioned Dame Frances Cairncross to conduct her independent 
report into the sustainability of high quality journalism in March 2018 and welcomed her 
detailed and considered report in February 2019. The Government is now considering her 
recommendations and will look to take action where appropriate.
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The Secretary of State has already written to the CMA in support of Dame Frances’ 
Recommendation that it undertakes a market review of digital advertising - it is right 
that policy-makers and regulators have an accurate understanding of how the market 
operates and check that it is enabling fair competition. A CMA review is the best means of 
achieving that. On zero-rating VAT for digital news publications, the Government keeps 
all taxes under review. Any decision to amend the UK tax regime is a matter for the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer as part of the annual fiscal cycle.
Dame Frances’ proposal for new codes of conduct between publishers and the online 
platforms that distribute their content deserves the Government’s full consideration. 
We will examine it closely along with considering the forthcoming report into digital 
competition in the UK by the Expert Panel chaired by Jason Furman.
We will continue to engage with press publishers, online platforms, regulators, academics, 
the public and parliamentarians, as we consider the way forward. We will set out our 
response later this year.
Recommendation 34
In common with other countries, the UK is clearly vulnerable to covert digital influence 
campaigns and the Government should be conducting analysis to understand the 
extent of the targeting of voters, by foreign players, during past elections. We ask the 
Government whether current legislation to protect the electoral process from malign 
influence is sufficient. Legislation should be in line with the latest technological 
developments, and should be explicit on the illegal influencing of the democratic 
process by foreign players. We urge the Government to look into this issue and to 
respond in its White Paper. (Paragraph 249)
Government response:
The Government is not being complacent about this issue and is committed to ensuring 
our democratic processes remain secure. The Government will continue to monitor 
hostile state activity. As highlighted above, the Online Harms White Paper sets out the 
steps we expect the new regulator to establish in a disinformation Code of Practice, which 
includes the requirement for service providers to improve the overall transparency of 
political advertising and publish data that supports research into the nature of online 
disinformation activity. We will take further steps where proportionate, and in line with 
our commitment to support freedom of speech and the GDPR, to detect, disrupt and deter 
hostile state disinformation.
Recommendation 36
There is a general principle that, subject to certain spending limits, funding from 
abroad is not allowed in UK elections. However, as the Electoral Commission has 
made clear, the current rules do not explicitly ban overseas spending. We recommend 
that, at the earliest opportunity, the Government reviews the current rules on overseas 
involvement in our UK elections to ensure that foreign interference in UK elections, 
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in the form of donations, cannot happen. We also need to be clear that Facebook, and 
all platforms, have a responsibility to comply with the law and not to facilitate illegal 
activity. (Paragraph 267)
Government response:
The law is clear that donations over £500 must come from permissible donors. This 
includes, but is not limited to, individuals in a UK electoral register (including overseas 
voters), UK-registered companies and trade unions, and political parties registered in 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The Government has committed to strengthening 
the current provisions which protect UK politics from foreign influence. While there is 
no evidence that Britain’s elections or referendums have been compromised by foreign 
interference, it is right that the Government safeguards against future risks.
The Government will take views of interested groups like the Parliamentary Parties Panel 
and the Electoral Commission to better understand the problems which Government could 
seek to address in the consultation, and to see what scope there is for broad cross-party 
agreement. The consultation may consider recommendations for increasing transparency 
on digital political advertising, including by third parties; closing loopholes on foreign 
spending in elections; preventing shell companies from sidestepping the current rules on 
political finance and on action to tackle foreign lobbying.
Recommendation 38
The Government should put pressure on social media companies to publicise any 
instances of disinformation. The Government needs to ensure that social media 
companies share information they have about foreign interference on their sites—
including who has paid for political adverts, who has seen the adverts, and who has 
clicked on the adverts—with the threat of financial liability if such information is not 
forthcoming. Security certificates, authenticating social media accounts, would ensure 
that a real person was behind the views expressed on the account. (Paragraph 272)
Government response:
It is vital that the social media companies are open and transparent about when foreign 
interference has taken place on their site and we strongly agree with the committee that 
this should be publicised where appropriate. The Government is encouraged by the efforts 
of several companies to make this information available. We have already seen many take 
steps to tackle the spread of disinformation and increase transparency on their platforms. 
Several have developed and implemented new systems to detect and remove fake accounts 
and coordinated inauthentic behaviour on their platforms. In addition, several of the 
major tech companies have produced transparency reports, which provide data on 
instances of such behaviour on their platforms, as well as the number of fake, spam or 
otherwise inauthentic accounts removed. We have also seen both Facebook and Twitter 
provide detailed accounts of coordinated inauthentic behaviour.
While these voluntary measures are welcome, we agree with the Committee that they 
do not go far enough. That is why the Online Harms White Paper sets out clearly the 
expectation for these companies to do more. This includes responsibilities for them to 
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increase the transparency of political advertising on their platforms; publish data that 
supports research into the nature of online disinformation activity; take action to 
eliminate and prevent accounts that misrepresent their owner’s identity or location to 
spread disinformation; and make it clear to users when they are interacting with automated 
accounts. The White Paper also sets out potential enforcement powers for the regulator, 
including fines.
Recommendation 39
We repeat our call to the Government to make a statement about how many 
investigations are currently being carried out into Russian interference in UK politics. 
We further recommend that the Government launches an independent investigation 
into past elections - including the UK election of 2017, the UK Referendum of 2016, 
and the Scottish Referendum of 2014 - to explore what actually happened with regard 
to foreign influence, disinformation, funding, voter manipulation, and the sharing of 
data, so that appropriate changes to the law can be made and lessons can be learnt for 
future elections and referenda. (Paragraph 273)
Government response:
In the UK, the Government does not, and cannot, direct the police, Electoral Commission 
or the Security Service to investigate particular allegations. These organisations are 
operationally independent of Ministers and take a professional view of the necessity and 
proportionality of using their investigative powers. There is no evidence of successful 
foreign interference in UK democratic processes, this includes the 2016 referendum and 
the 2017 general election. However we are not complacent, and the Government has taken 
steps to ensure that there is a coordinated structure across all relevant UK authorities to 
defend against hostile foreign interference in British politics from any state.
Recommendation 41
We recommend that the Government looks into ways that PR and strategic 
communications companies are audited, possibly by an independent body, to ensure 
that their campaigns do not conflict with the UK national interest and security 
concerns and do not obstruct the imposition of legitimate sanctions, as is the case 
currently with the legal selling of passports. Barriers need to be put in place to ensure 
that such companies cannot work on both sensitive UK Government projects and with 
clients whose intention might be to undermine those interests. (Paragraph 298)
Government response:
The Government recognises the Committee’s concern regarding PR and strategic 
communications companies. With regard to such companies working on UK Government 
projects, we have strict due diligence procedures in place to mitigate against conflicts of 
interest. During the formal procurement process conducted by the Crown Commercial 
Service (CCS), both the companies bidding for work and the government representatives 
evaluating them are required to declare any potential conflicts of interest. Bids are 
evaluated by the CCS, who accordingly determine whether company or evaluator can 
continue participating in the procurement process.
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Recommendation 42
The transformation of Cambridge Analytica into Emerdata illustrates how easy it is 
for discredited companies to reinvent themselves and potentially use the same data 
and the same tactics to undermine governments, including in the UK. The industry 
needs cleaning up. As the SCL/Cambridge Analytica scandal shows, the sort of bad 
practices indulged in abroad or for foreign clients, risk making their way into UK 
politics. Currently the strategic communications industry is largely self-regulated. 
The UK Government should consider new regulations that curb bad behaviour in this 
industry.
Government response:
The Data Protection Act 2018 applies to all UK data controllers and non-UK data 
controllers processing the data of UK citizens for the purposes of providing goods and 
services or monitoring behaviour. As the Information Commissioner’s report highlights, 
companies like Cambridge Analytica are as equally bound by these laws as any other data 
controller, and as such, the law explicitly prevents them from misusing personal data.
Under Section 198 of the Data Protection Act, criminal proceedings can be brought 
against a director, or person in or acting in a similar position, as well as the body corporate 
where it is proved that offences in the Act have occurred with the consent, connivance, or 
negligence of that person. The ICO would also be able to take enforcement action against 
those no longer in senior positions (for example through resignation), as long as they 
were a director at the relevant time. Criminal proceedings can be brought against such 
individuals even where the company they worked for has been dissolved or reinvented.
Recommendation 43
There needs to be transparency in these strategic communications companies, with 
a public record of all campaigns that they work on, both at home and abroad. They 
need to be held accountable for breaking laws during campaigns anywhere in the 
world or working for financially non-transparent campaigns. We recommend that the 
Government addresses this issue, when it responds to its consultation, ‘Protecting the 
Debate: Intimidation, Influence and Information’.
Government response:
We thank the Committee for highlighting this issue and we will consider their 
recommendation carefully. This recommendation was out of scope of the ‘Protecting the 
Debate: Intimidation, Influence and Information’ consultation. However, as highlighted, 
the Government is committed to increasing transparency online. That is why the steps 
we expect the new regulator to establish in the Code of Practice for disinformation 
includes the requirement for companies in scope to improve the transparency of political 
advertising.
Following the publication of the Cairncross review, we have also announced a government-
led review that will seek to assess the impact of the online advertising sector on both 
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society and the economy. It will consider the extent to which the current regulatory 
regime is equipped to tackle the challenges posed by rapid technological developments 
seen in online advertising.
Recommendation 44
We recommend that the Government revisits the UK Bribery Act, to gauge whether 
the legislation is enough of a regulatory brake on bad behaviour abroad. We also 
look to the Government to explore the feasibility of adopting a UK version of the US 
Foreign Agents and Registration Act (FARA), which requires “persons acting as agents 
of foreign principals in a political or quasi-political capacity to make periodic public 
disclosure of their relationships with the foreign principal, as well as activities, receipts 
and disbursements in support of those activities”. (Paragraph 301)
Government response:
The Bribery Act 2010 has been subject to full post-legislative review very recently by a House 
of Lords Select Committee. The Bribery Act 2010 Committee were appointed on 9 May 
2018. The Committee took oral and written evidence from Government, the prosecution 
agencies, private industry and legal experts in the field between July and December 2018. 
The Committee is expected to publish its findings in a final report at the end of March 
2019. The Government will regard the Committee’s findings with interest and will issue 
its official response in due course. All written and oral evidence given during the process 




The Home Office is currently leading a review of existing Counter-Hostile State Activity 
(C-HSA) legislation in the UK, to establish whether further primary legislation is required 
to strengthen our response to all forms of HSA. This includes consideration of the merits 
of introducing some form of foreign agent registration transparency scheme similar to 
those adopted by the US and Australia.
Recommendation 46
As we wrote in our Interim Report, digital literacy should be a fourth pillar of 
education, alongside reading, writing and maths. In its response, the Government did 
not comment on our Recommendation of a social media company levy, to be used, 
in part, to finance a comprehensive educational framework—developed by charities, 
NGOs, and the regulators themselves—and based online. Such a framework would 
inform people of the implications of sharing their data willingly, their rights over their 
data, and ways in which they can constructively engage and interact with social media 
sites. People need to be resilient about their relationship with such sites, particularly 
around what they read and what they write. We reiterate this Recommendation to the 
Government, and look forward to its response. (Paragraph 312)
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Government response:
The Government agrees with the Committee that digital literacy is key to long-term 
success in building our society’s resilience to disinformation and other online harms. The 
White Paper sets out both existing and proposed educational measures and initiatives to 
boost digital literacy.
As we set out in our response to the Committee’s Interim Report, digital literacy is already 
taught across the national school curriculum. This includes the computing curriculum, 
which teaches pupils about e-safety as well as the citizenship curriculum, which teaches 
pupils media literacy and explores freedom of speech and the role and responsibility of 
the media in informing and shaping public opinion. The White Paper highlights this and 
provides more detail on the subjects of Relationships Education, Relationships and Sex 
Education, and Health Education. We are making Relationships Education compulsory 
for all primary pupils, Relationships and Sex Education (RSE) compulsory for secondary 
pupils and Health Education compulsory for all pupils in all primary and secondary state-
funded schools. These subjects will teach pupils, among other things, how to consider 
information critically; how people represent themselves online; how data is gathered, 
shared and used; the rules and principles for keeping safe online; and how to recognise 
risks, harmful content and contact, and how to report them. This will complement what 
is already taught currently in maintained schools through the national curriculum for 
computing.
In the White Paper, we also recognise the work happening outside of Government to 
promote media and digital literacy. Several organisations in the tech and media industries 
as well as civil society have developed news literacy initiatives and resources to help school 
children recognise disinformation. While we welcome these initiatives, it is clear that 
more needs to be done to support the digital and media literacy needs of adults. We also 
recognise the need for improved coordination of activity. To address this, as the White 
Paper sets out, Ofcom are working with a number of partners to map existing media 
literacy initiatives. This work will help identify gaps and opportunities.
In addition, the White Paper announces our intention to develop an online media literacy 
strategy. To ensure its objectives are well informed by evidence and take account of existing 
work, we will consult widely, possibly through a new taskforce. Working with a range 
of partners, the first step will be a comprehensive mapping exercise to assess existing 
provision and identify what additional action is needed to make progress against key 
objectives, which may include building resilience to disinformation; ensuring people with 
disabilities are not excluded from digital literacy education and support; and equipping 
people to recognise and deal with a range of deceptive and manipulative behaviours 
online, including catfishing, grooming, extremism.
Furthermore, the Government wants to give the public confidence in information so they 
are equipped to make their own decisions about the issues that matter. To support this, as 
set out in the White Paper, we are developing a counter disinformation communications 
campaign which will support the public by providing them with the skills they need in 
order to recognise and respond to disinformation; showing people how it can affect them 
and what they can do about it.
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As highlighted in our response to Recommendation 9, the White Paper announces 
that we are considering a levy on tech companies to fund the ‘new’ regulator. This 
levy will indirectly fund digital literacy initiatives, as the regulator will have broader 
responsibilities to promote education and awareness raising about online safety, and to 
promote the development and adoption of safety technologies to tackle online harms, 
including disinformation. The White Paper also outlines the Government’s expectation 
for companies to fund and support preventative education and awareness-raising activity 
for users of their platforms.
The Cairncross Report (published on 12 February 2019) proposed that a ‘news quality 
obligation’ be imposed upon social media companies, with regulatory oversight. That 
would require these companies to improve how their users understand the origin of an 
article of news and the trustworthiness of its source. Dame Frances recognises that social 
media companies are already starting to accept responsibility in this regard. This proposal 
deserves the Government’s full consideration, and we will examine how it can inform our 
approach, including as part of the work set out in the White Paper.
Recommendation 47
The public need to know more about their ability to report digital campaigning that 
they think is misleading and or unlawful. Ofcom, the ASA, the ICO and the Electoral 
Commission need to raise their profiles so that people know about their services and 
roles. The Government should take a leading role in coordinating this crucial service 
for the public. The Government must provide clarity for members of the public about 
their rights with regards to social media companies. (Paragraph 313)
Government response:
The Government believes that accessible reporting options and features on social media 
platforms are important for empowering the public to flag the potentially harmful content 
they encounter online. Having effective reporting processes will be an integral part of 
fulfilling the new Duty of Care and will be covered in the Codes of Practice issued by the 
independent regulator. Furthermore, the Safety by Design framework proposed in the 
White Paper will include principles around user reporting, so that this crucial feature is 
built into new products and platforms as standard.
As highlighted in our response to Recommendation 25, the White Paper also notes that the 
disinformation Code of Practice, created by the regulator, should include the requirement 
for having clear reporting options for users to flag content and accounts they believe to be 
false or misleading.
The Government encourages Ofcom, the ASA, ICO and the Electoral Commission to 
continue to consider how best to raise their profile among the public, how to inform the 
public of their regulatory roles, and educate on rights both off and online.
Recommendation 48
Ofcom, the ICO, the Electoral Commission and the Advertising Standards Authority 
have all written separately about their role in promoting digital literacy. We 
recommend that the Government ensures that the four main regulators produce a 
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more united strategy in relation to digital literacy. Included in this united approach 
should be a public discussion on how we, as individuals, are happy for our data to 
be used and shared. People need to know how their data is being used (building on 
Recommendations we set out in Chapter Two of this Final Report). Users need to 
know how to set the boundaries that they want to, and how those boundaries should 
be set, with regard to their personal data. Included in this debate should be arguments 
around whether users want an agreed basic expectation of privacy, in a similar vein to 
a basic level of hygiene. Users could have the ability of opting out of such minimum 
thresholds, if they chose. (Paragraph 316)
Government response:
As stated above in response to Recommendation 46, the Government agrees with the 
Committee on the importance of digital and media literacy in helping people - both children 
and adults - critically assess information and protect themselves online. The White Paper 
sets out plans to develop an online media literacy strategy through broad consultation 
with a wide range of stakeholders (including tech companies, regulators, libraries, civil 
society and academics) to map out and assess work currently underway to build media 
and digital literacy, and also identify opportunities for further action. This will be part of 
the Government’s wider efforts to coordinate work in this area, complemented by Ofcom’s 
work with a number of partners to map existing media literacy initiatives. In addition, 
Ofcom have also committed to conducting further research around digital literacy levels 
in the UK to build understanding of existing provision and possible gaps. The White 
Paper also announces that the independent regulator will have a role in promoting digital 
and media literacy.
